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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys significant developments in intellectual property
(IP) law during the past year (i.e., 2018 or the Survey period).1 This arti-
cle reviews IP law developments that are likely to be influential in the
evolution of Texas IP jurisprudence. Thus, the cases cited focus on the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. For developments in trademark and copyright law,
although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s authority is
binding, other circuits are considered highly persuasive.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided several cases involving IP issues dur-
ing this Survey period. In patents, the Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality and statutory compliance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) Inter Partes Review (IPR) program.2 In these cases, the
Supreme Court teetered between expansive and limited views of the
PTO’s authority to adjudicate and develop its own rules and procedures.
The Supreme Court also addressed the ability to recover foreign lost
profits under 35 U.S.C. § 284.3 The Federal Circuit weighed in on when
summary judgment is appropriate for determinations of subject matter
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101,4 which aspects of the PTO’s discretion
to institute an IPR are subject to appeal,5 and whether patents assigned
to Native American tribes can be shielded from challenges at the PTO
under tribal immunity.6
In trademark, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consid-
ered whether a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding can reject a previ-
ously-granted trademark license,7 while the Federal Circuit weighed in
1. The views expressed in this article are the views of the individual authors, and are
not necessarily those of Haynes and Boone, LLP, its attorneys, or any of its clients.
2. Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (2018);
SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
3. WesternGeco, LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp, 1385 S. Ct. 2129, 2139 (2018).
4. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
5. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
6. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
7. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 394 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part sub
nom. Mission Prod. Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 397 (2018).
2019] Intellectual Property Law 211
standards for secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion.8 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the balance between
the public interests in freedom of expression and avoiding consumer con-
fusion.9 Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit clarified
which aspects of a television show can receive trademark protection.10 In
copyright, the Federal Circuit addressed to what extent computer code
that is copied and incorporated into a program can be considered a fair
use.11
II. PATENT UPDATE
A. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS
1. Pardon My Toe-Stepping, Article III – Oil States Energy Services v.
Greene’s Energy Group, LLC
Patent litigation in Article III courts can be an inherently long and ex-
pensive process. Plaintiff-friendly rules and complex, interdependent is-
sues can cause headaches for the alleged infringer, even when they have a
viable defense.12 IPR is a relatively new administrative adjudication pro-
cedure created by Congress to allow any party, including alleged infring-
ers, to challenge an issued patent at the PTO.13 An IPR may occur in lieu
of, or in addition to, a patent validity challenge in district court, and can
even proceed concurrently with district court litigation. IPRs quickly be-
came a popular option for defendants in patent infringement cases for
their potential to quickly and relatively cheaply result in the asserted pat-
ent being invalidated, without the need to go to district court trial.
Oil States, an oilfield service company, obtained a patent related to
wellhead equipment protection in 2001.14 Oil States sued Greene’s En-
ergy Group, LLC for patent infringement in the U.S. District Court for
Eastern District of Texas, to which Greene’s Energy responded by chal-
lenging the validity of the patent in district court.15 Greene’s Energy then
filed a petition to the PTO’s Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB) to
institute an IPR. The PTAB granted the petition, finding that Greene’s
Energy established a “reasonable likelihood that the two claims were un-
patentable.”16 As is common, the district court litigation and IPR contin-
ued concurrently, and their respective orders yielded conflicting results.17
The district court issued a claim construction order favorable to Oil
States, but the PTAB issued a final written decision invalidating the as-
8. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 909 F.3d 1110, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Royal
Crown Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
9. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 261 (9th Cir. 2018).
10. Viacom Int’l v. IJR Capital Invs., LLC, 891 F.3d 178, 182 (5th Cir. 2018).
11. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
12. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. 1348 (Mar. 8, 2011).
13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18.
14. Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (2018).
15. Id.
16. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
17. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1372; see also 35 U.S.C. § 315(a).
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serted claims of Oil States’ patent using a claim construction that differed
from the district court.18 Invalidation of the patent would foreclose Oil
States’ infringement claims.
Oil States appealed the PTAB’s ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, arguing, inter alia, that IPRs violate Article III and
the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution.19 In particular, Oil States
argued that patents are the exclusive purview of the Article III courts.20
Similarly, Oil States argued that patent validity is a conflict previously
decided at common law, and therefore affords the right of trial by jury.21
The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s decision over Oil States’ consti-
tutional challenge.22
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court,
affirmed the Federal Circuit and the PTAB, upholding the constitutional-
ity of IPRs in view of Article III and the Seventh Amendment.23 First, the
Supreme Court dealt with the distinction between matters of private
rights, which cannot be delegated to an administrative body, and public
rights, which can be delegated.24 Public rights can be described as those
“matters ‘which arise between the Government and persons subject to its
authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional func-
tions of the executive or legislative departments.’”25 The Supreme Court
cited a suite of precedent supporting its treatment of patents as public
rights, and described the inherent relationship between the grant of a pat-
ent and the public.26 Accordingly, the Supreme Court explained that
IPRs are simply a reconsideration of a grant of a public right, rather than
a confiscation of private rights.27 And, although some older cases have
referred to patents as “private property,” the Court explained that these
cases are not inconsistent with the more prevalent view that patents are
“public rights” created by, and subject to, statute.28
The Supreme Court also explained that patent validity is not a matter
that “from its nature, must be decided by a court.”29 To support its asser-
tion, the Supreme Court relied upon an 18th-century procedure used in
England to vacate a patent to illustrate that patent validity was not exclu-
sively a matter of common law.30 Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the
notion that IPRs violate Article III merely because its procedures imitate
18. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1372.
19. Id. at 1370, 1372.
20. Id. at 1372.
21. Id. at 1379.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1370, 1379.
24. Id. at 1373–74.
25. Id. at 1373 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
26. Id. at 1373–74.
27. Id. at 1374.
28. Id. at 1373–74 (citing United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888);
McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898)).
29. Id. at 1376–77 (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011) (internal quota-
tions omitted)).
30. Id. at 1377 (describing the Privy Council).
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those of Article III courts.31 Thus, because the IPRs were properly as-
signed to a non-Article III tribunal, “the Seventh Amendment pose[d] no
independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury
factfinder.”32 The Supreme Court explicitly noted, however, that its deci-
sion was “narrow,” and did not settle questions relating to procedural due
process or the takings clause.33
Justice Gorsuch wrote the sole dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts.34 The dissenting opinion illustrated the potential injustice
created by the majority’s holding, whereby a rightful patent holder could
spend years, and tens of thousands of dollars, to obtain a patent, only to
have her patent canceled by the PTO in an expedited proceeding, without
the protections and judicial independence afforded in federal court.35
2. All or Nothing for IPR Institutions – SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu
SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, like Oil States, addressed issues surrounding
IPRs.36 Interestingly, the dissenting Justice in Oil States, Justice Gorsuch,
wrote the 5–4 majority opinion in SAS.37 However, the issue in SAS is
relatively narrow when compared with the issues of Oil States. In particu-
lar, the question in SAS was whether the PTO, when it receives a petition
challenging multiple claims of a patent, can institute an IPR on only a
portion of the challenged claims.38 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
PTO must institute on all challenged claims, or may not institute at all.39
SAS petitioned for an IPR of sixteen claims of ComplementSoft’s
software patent.40 The PTAB instituted review on claims 1 and 3–10, but
declined to review the remaining challenged claims.41 The PTAB then
issued a final written decision invalidating claims 1, 3, and 5–10, and up-
holding claim 4 as valid.42 SAS sought review of the PTAB’s decision in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the PTO’s
practice of “partial institution” runs contrary to 35 U.S.C. § 318, which
states that “[i]f an inter partes review is instituted and not dismissed
under this chapter, the [PTAB] shall issue a final written decision with
respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the peti-
tioner . . . .”43 The Federal Circuit rejected SAS’s argument, upholding
the decision by the PTAB.44
31. Id. at 1378.
32. Id. at 1379.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
36. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
37. Id. at 1352.
38. Id. at 1354.
39. Id. at 1359–60.
40. Id. at 1354.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 35 U.S.C. § 318 (emphasis added).
44. SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1354.
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At the Supreme Court, the majority agreed with SAS that the plain
text of § 318 mandates that when the PTAB institutes an IPR on any
claim of the petition the PTAB must issue a final written decision for all
claims challenged by the petitioner.45 In particular, the Supreme Court
underscored the terms “shall,” which seems to exclude discretion by the
PTO to act to the contrary, and “any,” which “naturally carries ‘an expan-
sive meaning,’” and “ordinarily ‘refer[s] to a member of a particular
group or class without distinction or limitation’ . . . .”46 The petitioner, as
“master of its complaint,” was entitled to a written decision on all chal-
lenged claims.47 The Supreme Court also noted that the PTO does not
have the power to initiate an IPR—that power belongs to the
petitioner.48
The PTO made a number of arguments against the Court’s construc-
tion of the statute.49 First, the PTO argued that the statutory authority to
decide claims individually meant that the PTO should have the authority
to institute claims individually.50 Second, the PTO argued that § 314(a),
which gives discretion to the PTO to decide whether to institute a review
(“may institute”), also afforded the PTO the discretion to determine
which claims to institute.51 Third, the PTO argued that two sections of the
statute, which draw a distinction between claims “in the petition” and
claims challenged “by the petitioner,” suggest that the statute contem-
plates the PTO’s ability to grant partial institutions.52 The Supreme Court
rejected all of these arguments, simply referring to the plain text of the
statute.53 The Supreme Court also declined to entertain the PTO’s policy
arguments regarding the efficiencies of partial institution, deferring to
Congress on matters of policy, and rebuffed the PTO’s plea for deference
under Chevron,54 explaining that the PTO’s interpretation would not pass
muster under Chevron.55
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined in dissent, la-
menting the majority’s “wooden” reading of the statute, and arguing that
the unconditional discretion given to the PTAB as to whether to institute
a petition at all suggested a different interpretation of § 318.56 In particu-
lar, the dissent argued that the holding was ineffective, because the PTO
could continue to effectively issue partial institutions by using its discre-
tion to deny institution as a whole, and suggesting that some claims in the
45. Id. at 1359–60.
46. Id. at 1354 (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); OXFORD EN-
GLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2016)).
47. Id. at 1355.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1355–59.
50. Id. at 1355–56; 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
51. SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1356–57.
52. Id. at 1357–58; 35 U.S.C. §§ 314, 318.
53. SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1355–59.
54. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deferring
to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes).
55. Id. at 1357–58.
56. Id. at 1360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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petition may be worthy of reexamination.57 The dissent also disagreed
that the term “any” in § 318(a) refers to all claims challenged in the peti-
tioner’s originally filed petition.58
The aftermath of SAS is a heavier workload for the PTAB that must
now undertake all-or-nothing review.
3. “Abroad” Take on Foreign Infringement – WesternGeco LLC v.
ION Geophysical Corp.
In WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., the U.S. Supreme
Court was called upon to determine whether foreign infringing activity
can evoke foreign lost profits recoverable in the United States.59 The Su-
preme Court, in a 7–2 decision written by Justice Thomas, took a broad
interpretation of the damages statute, 35 U.S.C. § 284, and determined
that foreign lost profits can be granted under § 271(f)(2).60
As a general rule, the extraterritoriality doctrine limits the applicability
of statutes to domestic activity.61 Accordingly, U.S. patent statutes gener-
ally cover only those activities that occur within the United States.62
However, § 271(f) accounts for situations in which the infringement of a
patent is not technically complete within the United States, but a foreign
infringement is induced or initiated within the United States.63 For exam-
ple, § 271(f)(2) provides for recovery when a party, without making, sell-
ing, or using a complete embodiment covered by the claims of the patent,
[S]upplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any
component of a patented invention that is especially made or espe-
cially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing
that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such
component will be combined outside of the United States in a man-
ner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States.64
WesternGeco owns a number of patents covering systems for surveying
the ocean floor.65 In 2007, ION started manufacturing an indistinguish-
able competing system by manufacturing components of the system in the
United States and sending them overseas for assembly outside of the
United States.66 In a suit brought by WesternGeco, the jury found ION
liable under §§ 271(f)(1) and (2), and awarded $12.5 million in royalties
57. Id. at 1360, 1363.
58. Id. at 1361–62.
59. WesternGeco, LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
60. Id. at 2134.
61. Id. at 2136.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2137–38.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).
65. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2135.
66. Id.
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and $93.4 million in lost profits.67 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit granted ION’s motion to set aside the award of
lost profits, finding that it violated the extraterritoriality doctrine.68 The
Supreme Court then vacated the Federal Circuit’s ruling, and remanded
in light of the recently decided Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics,
Inc.69 But, on remand, the Federal Circuit reinstated the portion of its
opinion that denied the award of foreign lost profits.70
The Supreme Court reinstated the award for foreign lost profits, find-
ing that § 271(f)(2) is not constrained by the extraterritoriality doctrine.71
As explained by the Supreme Court, the extraterritoriality doctrine,
which generally restricts the effect of statutes (including the patent in-
fringement damages statute, § 284) to domestic activity, can be overcome
in two ways.72 First, the presumption that the extraterritoriality doctrine
applies can be explicitly rebutted by the statute in question.73 Second, a
statute can apply extraterritorially if the conduct relevant to the focus of
the statute occurred within the United States.74 Here, the Supreme Court
broadly characterized the focus of § 284 as making patent holders whole
after an infringement, and stated that § 271(f)(2) focuses on domestic
conduct—the supply of certain components of a patented invention from
the United States.75 Because the conduct of ION was domestic and within
the focus of § 271(f)(2), the extraterritoriality doctrine did not apply, and
§ 284 allows for lost profits corresponding to ION’s foreign sales.76
The Supreme Court rejected ION’s arguments that § 284’s focus was
on the award of damages, not on remedying infringement, and that
awarding foreign lost profits under § 271(f)(2) constituted an extraterrito-
rial application of § 284.77 Rather, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
foreign sales were “merely incidental to the infringement” under
§ 272(f)(2).78 The Supreme Court also asserted that ION was mistaken to
suggest that the Court’s previous characterization of RICO damages
claims as improperly extraterritorial in RJR Nabisco Inc. v. European
Community79 should lead to a similar conclusion here.80 The Supreme
Court explained that ION’s arguments that an award of foreign lost prof-
its was an extraterritorial application of § 284 “wrongly conflates legal
injury with the damages arising from that injury.”81
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2135–36 (citing Halo Elecs, Inc. v. Pulse Elecs, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016)).
70. Id. at 2136.
71. Id. at 2138.
72. Id. at 2136–37.
73. Id. at 2136.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2137–38.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2138.
78. Id.
79. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Justices Gorsuch and Breyer, dissenting, disagreed with the majority’s
broad construction of § 284 as focused on remedying any and all infring-
ing activity.82 The dissent suggested that because the patent at issue is a
U.S. patent, WesternGeco would not—and should not—be able to expect
monopoly rents and royalties for activities abroad.83 In other words,
awards of damages should “tie[ ] the measure of damages to the degree of
interference with the patent owner’s exclusive right to make, use, and sell
its invention.”84
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS
1. Concrete Facts for Abstract Ideas – Berkheimer v. HP Inc.
In Berkheimer v. HP Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit clarified the standards of proof related to determinations of sub-
ject matter eligibility.85 The case prompted a memorandum from the
PTO clarifying burden shifting and evidentiary requirements for support-
ing a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.86
To be granted, an application for patent must satisfy a number of statu-
tory requirements, including novelty, nonobviousness, and subject matter
eligibility.87 The statutory foundation for subject matter eligibility is
§ 101, which allows patents to be granted for “any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, . . . subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title.”88 Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted § 101
to include a prohibition on patents that preempt the use of the building
blocks of ingenuity.89 Accordingly, in determining whether a patent claim
meets the requirements of § 101, the PTO (or court) must “‘determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to’ a patent-ineligible concept,”
such as an abstract idea.90 If the PTO determines that the claims are di-
rected to a patent-ineligible concept, the PTO then determines whether
the claim contains elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into
a patent eligible application.”91 Claim elements can transform the claim
into a patent eligible invention if they “involve more than performance of
‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known
82. Id. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 2139–40.
84. Id. at 2141.
85. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
86. Robert W. Bahr, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.), U.S. PAT-
ENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Apr. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Berkheimer Memorandum].
87. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03.
88. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
89. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134
S. Ct. 2347, 2354–55 (2014)).
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
78–79 (2012)).
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to the inquiry.’”92
Steven Berkheimer is the holder of U.S. Patent No. 7,447,713 (‘713 pat-
ent), which is directed to “digitally processing and archiving files in a digi-
tal asset management system.”93 Mr. Berkheimer sued HP for
infringement of claims 1–7 and 9–19 of the ‘713 patent.94 After a claim
construction hearing which resulted in claim 10 being invalidated as in-
definite under § 112, HP moved for summary judgment that claims 1–7
and 9 were ineligible under § 101.95 The district court granted HP’s mo-
tion, finding that the claims were directed to an abstract idea, and did not
contain an inventive concept other than what was “well-understood, rou-
tine, [and] conventional” in the art.96
After affirming the district court’s ruling on indefiniteness from the
claim construction hearing, the Federal Circuit panel addressed the dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment for patent ineligibility.97 The
Federal Circuit clarified that, while patent eligibility under § 101 is a mat-
ter of law, it is based on underlying issues of fact.98 Although the Federal
Circuit agreed that summary judgment was proper for claims 1–3 and 9,
the court vacated summary judgment for claims 4–7.99 In particular, the
court noted that Mr. Berkheimer successfully raised a genuine issue of
material fact by pointing out a number of advantages related to the sub-
ject matter of claims 4–7 described in the specification.100 Thus, while the
panel declined to hold claims 4–7 as patent eligible, it determined that
summary judgment was not appropriate and remanded back to the dis-
trict court for a determination on subject matter eligibility.101 A petition
for writ of certiorari is currently with the Supreme Court.102
The Federal Circuit’s ruling prompted the PTO to release a memoran-
dum describing new guidelines for making rejections under § 101 more
concrete.103 In particular, the Berkheimer memorandum laid out a num-
ber of ways to support determinations that claim elements are well-un-
derstood, routine, or conventional.104 The guidance provided in
Berkheimer and its corresponding memorandum should serve to clarify
92. Id. at 1367 (quoting Content Extraction & Transmission, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank,
Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
93. Id. at 1362.
94. Id. at 1363.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1363, 1368.
97. Id. at 1363–65.
98. Id. at 1365, 1369.
99. Id. at 1370–71.
100. Id. at 1369–70.
101. Id. at 1370–71.
102. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, HP Inc. v. Berkheimer, 2018 WL 4819013
(No.180415).
103. Berkheimer Memorandum, supra note 86, at 3–4.
104. Berkheimer Memorandum, supra note 86, at 3–4; Christopher C. Johns & Adriana
L. Burgy, Berkheimer Memorandum: A Big Shift, in Fact, FINNEGAN PROSECUTION FIRST
BLOG (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/prosecution-first/berk-
heimer-memorandum-a-big-shift-in-fact.html [https://perma.cc/Z5V7-8XNR].
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the eligibility analysis for patent examiners and patent practitioners
alike.105
2. More Supervision for the PTAB – Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom
Corporation
When a petition for IPR is filed with the PTO, the director has the
discretion to determine whether to institute the petition.106 35 U.S.C.
§ 314(d) specifies that the director’s determination is not subject to ap-
peal.107 In Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corporation, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reigned in the scope of § 314(a)’s nonap-
pealability provision, holding that the director’s obligation under § 315(b)
to deny institution for time-barred IPR petitions can be appealed.108
To challenge a patent in an IPR, the challenger files a petition with the
director of the PTO.109 Section 314(a) of the IPR statute gives the direc-
tor, via the PTAB, the discretion to institute the petition if “there is a
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”110 Section 314(d)
deems the director’s determination to institute as “nonappealable.”111
However, § 315(b) requires the director to deny institution “if the peti-
tion requesting the proceeding is filed more than [one] year after the date
on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is
served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”112 A panel
of the Federal Circuit in Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc.
previously decided that the director’s decision of whether a petition is
time-barred under § 315(b) is also nonappealable.113
Ericsson sued several parties, including Intel, Dell, and Toshiba, for
infringement of three patents in 2010.114 In 2013, Broadcom, which was
not a defendant in the Ericsson litigation, filed IPR petitions for each of
the patents asserted by Ericsson.115 Ericsson transferred the patents to
Wi-Fi One, LLC, before Broadcom filed the IPR petitions.116 In response
to Broadcom’s IPR petition, Wi-Fi One argued that Broadcom was in
privity with the defendants in the Ericsson litigation, and that
Broadcom’s IPR petitions were therefore time-barred under § 315(b).117
The PTAB rejected Wi-Fi One’s argument, and issued a final written de-
cision.118 A panel of the Federal Circuit upheld the PTAB’s decision,
105. See, e.g., Johns & Burgy, supra note 104.
106. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
107. Id. § 314(d).
108. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
109. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 312.
110. Id. § 314(a).
111. Id. §§ 314(a); 314(d).
112. Id. § 315(b).
113. Achates Reference Publ’g Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
114. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1370–71.
118. Id. at 1371.
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holding that Achates was still good law.119 The Federal Circuit then
granted Wi-Fi One’s petition for rehearing en banc to determine whether
the director’s time-bar determinations under § 315(b) were appealable.120
En banc, the full panel noted the importance of judicial review, and
restated that the presumption in favor of review can only be overcome
“when Congress provides a ‘clear and convincing’ indication that it in-
tends to prohibit review.”121 The court found that there was no such indi-
cation that the scope of § 314(d) extended to the time-bar requirements
of § 315(b).122 In particular, the court underscored the fact that § 314(d)
explicitly limits its application to “this section.”123 The court also drew
distinctions between the nature and purpose of § 314 as a discretionary
and preliminary filter of decisions on substantive grounds, and the nature
and purpose of § 315 as a mandatory restriction on the director on proce-
dural grounds.124 Accordingly, the court overruled Achates’ contrary con-
clusion, and remanded to the panel below to consider the merits of Wi-Fi
One’s time-bar appeal.125 The court noted that its decision applies only to
the appealability of § 315(b), and not to the remaining sections and sub-
sections in §§ 311–14.126
3. What Drug Companies Cannot Immunize —Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals
In Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit closed off a patent-shielding strategy of
pharmaceutical companies that involved assigning patents to Native
American tribes and asserting tribal immunity.127
Allergan, Inc. sued Mylan Pharmaceuticals for infringement of multi-
ple Allergan patents covering its dry eye treatment product.128 The al-
leged infringement was Mylan’s Abbreviated New Drug Applications to
the FDA for generic versions of Allergan’s drugs.129 Mylan responded by
petitioning for an IPR of Allergan’s patents, which the PTAB insti-
tuted.130 Before the IPR hearing, Allergan assigned its patents to the
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe (Tribe) to protect the patents from review us-
ing the doctrine of sovereign immunity, applied here as “tribal immu-




121. Id. at 1372.
122. Id. at 1372, 1374–75.
123. Id. at 1372 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 314(d)).
124. Id. at 1372–73.
125. Id. at 1375.
126. Id.
127. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s ruling that tribal immunity
does not apply.133 The court explained some guidelines for determining
whether tribal immunity does or does not apply to administrative proce-
dures, but acknowledged that there is not “a blanket rule that immunity
does not apply in federal agency proceedings.”134 One important consid-
eration is whether the administrative action seems more like a conflict
between private parties, or an independent use of authority by the gov-
ernment.135 Although, as the court acknowledged, “IPR is neither clearly
a judicial proceeding instituted by a private party nor clearly an enforce-
ment action brought by the federal government,” the court ultimately de-
termined that the PTO director’s broad authority and discretion over the
institution of IPRs makes the proceedings more akin to government ac-
tion than a private conflict.136 Accordingly, tribal immunity did not
apply.137
The Federal Circuit’s holding has, for now, halted a scheme that would
almost certainly have caused unintended policy concerns.138 The Su-
preme Court denied the Saint Regis Tribe’s petition for certiorari.139
C. CASES TO WATCH
In 2019, we could see the U.S. Supreme Court weigh in on a number of
patent-related issues, including standing for appeal from the PTO140 and
standards of proof related to determinations of subject matter
elibigility.141 In RPX Corp. v. Chanbond LLC, RPX petitioned the Court
to decide whether a party has standing in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit to appeal an adverse PTAB decision on the basis of
lack of patent-inflicted injury-in-fact.142 In HP Inc. v. Berkheimer, which
is discussed above, the Court may weigh in on whether and to what ex-
tent patent subject matter eligibility is a question for the jury.143
III. TRADEMARK UPDATE
A. A CIRCUIT SPLIT WIDENS – IN RE TEMPNOLOGY, LLC
In In re Tempnology, LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit weighed in on a circuit split concerning the applicability of
133. Id. at 1329.
134. Id. at 1325–26.
135. Id. at 1326.
136. Id. at 1326–27.
137. Id. at 1327, 1329.
138. Katie Thomas, How to Protect a Drug Patent? Give It to a Native American Tribe,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/health/allergan-patent-
tribe.html.
139. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 2019 WL 1590253 (No. 18-899)
(denying certioriari).
140. RPX Corp. v. ChanBond, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 306 (2018).
141. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
142. RPX Corp., 139 S. Ct. 306.
143. 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), placed on the docket October 3, 2018.
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§ 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to trademark licenses.144 Under bank-
ruptcy law, a company filing for Chapter 11 protection can “‘reject any
executory contract’ that, in the debtor’s business judgment, is not benefi-
cial to the company.”145 However, the bankruptcy code provides some
protections for licensees of intellectual property. Under § 365(n)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Code, “[w]hen the rejected contract . . . is one ‘under
which the debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual property,’ the licen-
see may elect to ‘retain its rights . . . to such intellectual property.”146
Importantly, the statutory definition of intellectual property with respect
to § 365(n) does not include trademarks.147
Here, Tempnology, LLC, having filed for protection under Chapter 11,
sought to reject an agreement that granted certain distribution and trade-
mark rights to Mission Product Holdings, Inc. When Tempnology filed
the rejection motion, Mission objected by “arguing that 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(n) allowed Mission to retain both its intellectual property license
and its exclusive distribution rights.”148 The bankruptcy court held that
neither the exclusive distribution rights nor the trademark rights are pro-
tected by § 365(n).149
The court first considered Mission’s argument that the contract provi-
sion granting Mission the exclusive right to distribute some of
Tempnology’s products was, in effect, an exclusivity provision of
Tempnology’s intellectual property rights.150 The court rejected Mission’s
argument, holding that “the right to sell a product is clearly not included
within the statute’s definition of intellectual property,” and that “[a]n ex-
clusive right to sell a product is not equivalent to an exclusive right to
exploit the product’s underlying intellectual property.”151
The court next considered whether, after Tempnology rejected the
agreement granting Mission rights to use Tempnology’s trademarks, Mis-
sion retained its right to use such trademarks in accordance with § 365(1),
which allows licensees of intellectual property rights to retain such rights
even after the licensor has rejected the agreement.152 The court affirmed
the bankruptcy court’s decision, holding that “section 365(n) does not ap-
ply to Mission’s . . . trademark license,” and thus Mission did not retain
any rights to Tempnology’s trademarks under the contract.153 The court
quoted from the Senate Report, which stated that Congress intentionally
excluded trademarks from § 365(n)’s list of intellectual property pro-
144. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part sub nom.
Mission Prod. Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 397 (mem.) (U.S. Oct. 26, 2018)
(No. 17-1657).
145. Id. at 394 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)).
146. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 392 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)).
147. Id. at 397; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
148. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 394.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 398.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 396, 401; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(1).
153. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 395 (1st Cir. 2018).
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tected from court-approved rejection “‘to allow the development of equi-
table treatment of this situation by the bankruptcy courts.’”154
The court also rejected reasoning put forth by the Bankruptcy Appel-
late Panel for the First Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit that, even if a debtor-licensor rejects a trademark license
agreement under § 365(a), a trademark licensee’s trademark rights can
survive the licensor’s rejection of the agreement.155 The court explained
that a licensee’s continued use of a trademark under a contract that the
licensor has effectively breached would place an improper burden on the
debtor to “monitor and exercise control over the quality of the goods sold
to the public under cover of the trademark,” as is required under trade-
mark law for effective licensing.156 In fact, the court states that “Con-
gress’s principal aim in providing for rejection was to ‘release the debtor’s
estate from burdensome obligations that can impede a successful
reorganization.’”157
The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the First Circuit’s decision in May
2019.158 In December 2018, the U.S. government filed an amicus curiae
brief urging the Supreme Court to rule in Mission’s favor, explaining that
allowing a trademark licensor to revoke a trademark license would be
akin to allowing a landlord to terminate a lease by “refusing to pay the
cable bill.”159
B. THE SNEAKER WARS CONTINUE – CONVERSE, INC. V.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
SKETCHERS U.S.A., INC.
In Converse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission Sketchers U.S.A.,
Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered the
appeal of a decision from the U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC), which found that Converse’s trademark registration in the midsole
design of its Chuck Taylor All Star shoe was invalid, that the common law
mark had not acquired secondary meaning, and thus, that the import of
similar shoes did not violate the Tariff Act.160 In 2014, Converse filed a
complaint with the ITC alleging that various shoes imported into the
United States infringed its trademark in the Chuck Taylor shoe trade
dress, and subsequently appealed the ITC finding.
The court held that the ITC applied the wrong standard when deter-
mining the trademark registration’s invalidity, and whether the mark was
154. Id. at 401 (quoting SEN. REP. NO. 100–105, at 5).
155. Id. at 395, 404.
156. Id. at 403.
157. Id. at 402 (quoting Bildisco v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)).
158. Mission Prod. Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC, 2019 WL 2166392 (U.S. May 20,
2019).
159. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 11, 15, Mission Product Holdings,
139 S. Ct. 397 (2018) (No. 17–1657).
160. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 909 F.3d 1110, 1113
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
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infringed. First, the court explained that the ITC never pinpointed a spe-
cific date from which to assess secondary meaning.161 In order to be valid,
a product design trade dress must have secondary meaning. Thus, to find
infringement of that design, the first infringing use must have taken place
after the design obtained secondary meaning. The court held that Con-
verse’s registration only confers a presumption of secondary meaning as
of the date of registration, not before.162 The court also held that, to
prove infringement based on uses before its registration, Converse must
show secondary meaning before the first infringing use.163
Second, the court held that the ITC used the wrong legal standard to
determine secondary meaning.164 In doing so, the court articulated six
factors to consider in the secondary meaning analysis:
(1) association of the trade dress with a particular source by actual
purchasers (typically measured by customer surveys); (2) length, de-
gree, and exclusivity of use; (3) amount and manner of advertising;
(4) amount of sales and number of customers; (5) intentional copy-
ing; and (6) unsolicited media coverage of the product embodying
the mark.165
The court also found that, in finding no secondary meaning, “the ITC
relied too heavily on prior uses long predating the first infringing uses
and the date of registration.”166 Quoting the Lanham Act, the court ex-
plained that the most relevant period for considering proof of substan-
tially exclusive and continuous use is “‘five years before the date on
which the claim of distinctiveness is made.’”167 Uses outside of this five-
year period should only be considered if they are “likely to have im-
pacted consumers’ perceptions of the mark as of the relevant date.”168
Finally, regarding standards for determining likelihood of confusion,
the court found that the ITC had failed to consider whether the allegedly
infringing products were “substantially similar” to Converse’s trade dress,
and clarified that “products that are not substantially similar cannot in-
fringe.”169 The court instructed that, on remand, the ITC should deter-
mine whether the allegedly infringing products are substantially
similar.170
161. Id. at 1116.
162. Id. at 1118.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1119.
165. Id. at 1120.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1121 (quoting the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1124.
170. Id.
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C. ZERO SUM GAME – ROYAL CROWN COMPANY, INC. V.
THE COCA-COLA COMPANY
In Royal Crown Company, Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Company, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board’s (the Board) dismissal of Royal Crown’s oppositions to
Coca-Cola’s marks for soft drinks and sports drinks that contain the term
“ZERO” without a disclaimer.171
Coca-Cola filed multiple federal trademark applications for marks con-
taining the term “ZERO,” ultimately claiming that the “ZERO” portion
of the mark acquired distinctiveness in order to avoid disclaiming the de-
scriptive term.172 After Coca-Cola’s marks were approved for publication
with a disclaimer of the word “ZERO,” Royal Crown filed oppositions on
the grounds that the term “ZERO” was merely descriptive and was ge-
neric for certain beverage products, and thus failed to indicate the source
of goods.173 The Board dismissed Royal Crown’s oppositions, finding that
Royal Crown had failed to prove that the term “ZERO” was generic in
connection with soft drinks and sports drinks and finding that Coca-
Cola’s ZERO marks had acquired distinctiveness.174
Royal Crown appealed, and the Federal Circuit concluded that the
Board made several errors in its legal analysis and vacated and remanded
the Board’s dismissal of the opposition. First, the Board erred in its fram-
ing of the genericness question by “fail[ing] to examine whether ZERO
identified a key aspect of the genus at issue” or whether the public would
consider ZERO to be generic for a subcategory of the soft drinks ge-
nus.175 As the court explained, a term can be generic “if the relevant pub-
lic . . . understands the term to refer to a key aspect of that genus.”176 The
court reasoned that “ZERO need not be equated . . . with the entire
broad genus [of soft drinks] . . . in order for the term to be generic.”177
With regard to the genericness inquiry, the Board also failed to consider
the perception of the term ZERO in connection with Coca-Cola’s brand
names, incorrectly divorcing the term from its combination marks.178
Finally, the court held that the Board also erred in its determination
that Coca-Cola’s ZERO marks had acquired distinctiveness by failing to
first consider the level of distinctiveness of the marks.179 As the court
reminded the Board, “the applicant’s burden of showing acquired distinc-
tiveness increases with the level of descriptiveness” of the mark at is-
sue.180 Thus, the court instructed the Board that, on remand, if the
171. Royal Crown Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1363.
174. Id. at 1364.
175. Id. at 1366, 1368 (emphasis in original).
176. Id. at 1367 (emphasis in original).
177. Id. at 1368.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting In re Seelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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question of acquired distinctiveness was reached, the Board must first
“make an express finding regarding the degree of the mark’s descriptive-
ness on the scale ranging from generic to merely descriptive.”181
D. HONEY BADGER MIGHT CARE – GORDON V.
DRAPE CREATIVE, INC.
In Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit considered whether the Rogers test barred the application
of the Lanham Act where a greeting cards manufacturer used the phrases
“Honey Badger Don’t Care” and “Honey Badger Don’t Give a S—-” on
its cards.182
The plaintiff, the creator of the well-known YouTube video that popu-
larized the phrases “Honey Badger Don’t Care” and “Honey Badger
Don’t Give a S—-,” sued Drape Creative, Inc., and Papyrus-Recycled
Greetings, Inc. for its use of the phrases on greeting cards.183 The plaintiff
owns federal trademark registrations for the “HONEY BADGER
DON’T CARE” phrase in connection with greeting cards, among other
consumer items.184 The district court found that the plaintiff’s trademark
infringement claims were barred by the Rogers test, and granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants.185
The court of appeals came to a different conclusion, finding that the
Rogers test did not necessarily bar the application of the Lanham Act.186
When a plaintiff brings a claim of trademark infringement that involves
an artistic work, courts apply the Rogers test to determine whether “the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public in-
terest in free expression.”187 Specifically, under this test, the Lanham Act
can apply to an expressive work where (1) the plaintiff’s mark is “artisti-
cally relevant to the work”; or (2) the use of the plaintiff’s mark “explic-
itly misleads consumers as to the source or the content of the work.”188
Although the court agreed with the district court’s determination that
the use of the plaintiff’s “Honey Badger . . .” phrases were artistically
relevant to the work, the court disagreed with the lower court’s analysis
under the second prong.189 The lower court required “the defendants [to]
make an ‘affirmative statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorse-
ment’” in order to find that the expressive work materially misleads con-
sumers.190 The court of appeals held that an artistic or expressive work
can be found to materially mislead consumers even without such direct
181. Id. at 1369.
182. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 261 (9th Cir. 2018).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 260.
186. Id. at 261.
187. Id. at 264.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 269.
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references to the plaintiff.191 In fact, “the use of a mark alone may explic-
itly mislead consumers . . . if consumers would ordinarily identify the
source by the mark itself.”192 The court noted two relevant considerations
in assessing the second prong: the similarity of the junior and senior uses
of the mark and “the extent to which the junior user has added his or her
own expressive content.”193 The court concluded that a jury could decide
that the defendants’ use of the phrases on the greeting cards is explicitly
misleading, so the court of appeals reversed the district court’s finding of
summary judgment.194
E. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WADES INTO BIKINI BOTTOM – VIACOM
INTERNATIONAL V. IJR CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, LLC
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld summary judg-
ment in favor of Viacom International Inc. on its trademark infringement
and unfair competition claims against IJR Capital Investments, LLC.195
In a case of first impression, the court held that “specific elements from
within a television show—as opposed to the title of the show itself—[can]
receive trademark protection.”196
Viacom owns SpongeBob SquarePants, an animated television series
that premiered in 1999.197 The Krusty Krab, the center of the controversy
in this case, is a fast-food restaurant in the show’s fictional town of Bikini
Bottom.198 In 2014, IJR made plans to open seafood restaurants in Texas
and California named Krusty Krab.199 The defendant also filed a federal
trademark application for THE KRUSTY KRAB for restaurant ser-
vices.200 After first sending a cease-and-desist letter to IJR, Viacom sued
for unfair competition under the Lanham Act and trademark infringe-
ment under Texas common law, among several other claims.201 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for Viacom’s unfair competition
and common law trademark infringement claims, and IJR then
appealed.202
Regarding Viacom’s rights in The Krusty Krab mark, the court held
that “specific elements from within a television show—as opposed to the
title of the show itself—[can] receive trademark protection,” reasoning
that “[e]xtending trademark protection to elements of television shows
that serve as source identifiers can serve” to protect goodwill and invest-
191. Id. at 270.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 271.
195. Viacom Int’l v. IJR Capital Invs., LLC, 891 F.3d 178, 182 (5th Cir. 2018).
196. Id. at 186–87.
197. Id. at 183.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 183–84.
201. Id. at 184.
202. Id.
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ments made in trade names, and to guard against consumer confusion.203
However, the court also stated that “use within a popular television series
does not necessarily mean that the mark is used as a source identifier.”204
The question in this case was “whether The Krusty Krab mark, ‘as used,
will be recognized in itself as an indication of origin for the particular
product or service’” or whether it “creates a separate and distinct com-
mercial impression.”205 The court explained that “[i]n evaluating whether
elements of a television series are trademarks, the focus is on the role
that the element plays within the show and not the overall success or
recognition of the show itself,” reasoning that “an element [that] plays a
more central role in a franchise” will usually receive trademark protec-
tion.206 The court found that The Krusty Krab’s “central role” in the
SpongeBob franchise provided “strong evidence” that the mark serves as
an indication of origin for the show and its associated goods.207
The court also found that The Krusty Krab mark acquired distinctive-
ness through secondary meaning, based on the number of episodes that
include the restaurant, the millions of dollars Viacom earned on goods
and films that featured The Krusty Krab mark, and its popularity in the
media.208
Regarding likelihood of confusion, the court found an “impermissible”
likelihood that “consumers would affiliate Viacom’s legally protectable
The Krusty Krab mark with IJR’s seafood restaurant by the same name”
in light of the strength of the plaintiff’s mark and the fact that IJR’s mark
was identical.209 Moreover, although Viacom’s mark referenced a fic-
tional hamburger restaurant and IJR’s mark was to be used for a seafood
restaurant, “Viacom could naturally develop a real The Krusty Krab res-
taurant based on the fictional eatery, as its subsidiary did when it licensed
Bubba Gump Shrimp Co.,” which weighed in favor of a likelihood of
confusion.210
IV. COPYRIGHT UPDATE
A. HEY GOOGLE, IS THIS FAIR USE? – ORACLE AMERICA, INC.
V. GOOGLE LLC
In Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit held that Google’s use of Oracle’s Java software in the
Android platform was not fair use as a matter of law.211
203. Id. at 187.
204. Id. at 188.
205. Id. (quoting In re Morganroth, 208 U.S.P.Q. 284, 287 (T.T.A.B. 1980) (emphasis in
original)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 188 (5th Cir. 2018).
208. Id. at 191.
209. Id. at 198.
210. Id. at 197.
211. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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After an unsuccessful attempt to create its own application program-
ming interface (API) and multiple unsuccessful licensing discussions with
Oracle’s predecessor, Sun Microsystems, Google copied verbatim the de-
claring code and Single Sign-on (SSO) for thirty-seven of Oracle’s
APIs.212 Oracle originally filed a copyright infringement suit against
Google for Google’s unauthorized use of Oracle’s API packages in its
Android operating system.213 In the first trial, the jury found that Google
infringed Oracle’s copyrights, but came to no decision regarding whether
such use was fair.214 The district court ultimately found that the API
packages were not copyrightable, a decision which Oracle appealed to the
Federal Circuit. On appeal, the circuit court held that the Java packages,
in particular the declaring code and the SSO, were copyrightable.215 On
remand, the jury sided with Google, finding fair use, and the district court
denied Oracle’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.216 Oracle then
appealed the district court’s final judgment and denial of its motion.217
Google cross-appealed to “‘preserv[e] its claim that the declarations/SSO
are not protected by copyright law.’”218
The court of appeals considered four factors in determining the case’s
dispositive question—whether the use was fair.219 For the first factor, the
purpose and character of the use, the court held that Google’s use of the
API packages was commercial and the use was not transformative, as the
copying was verbatim and was used “for an identical function and pur-
pose” with “no changes to the expressive content or message.”220 The
court found that the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
weighed slightly in favor of a finding of fair use because reasonable jurors
could have accepted Google’s assertions that the copied portions were
functional, rather than entirely creative.221 The third factor, the amount
and substantiality of the portion used, was neutral and even “arguably
weighs against” fair use, based on the amount and significance of code
Google copied.222 The fourth factor, the effect upon the potential market,
weighed heavily against a finding of fair use, based on the actual and
potential market harm that was supported by evidence that both Android
and the Java Platform were used on mobile devices.223 The court noted
that, although Oracle may not have operated in the mobile phone market
at that time, Oracle intended to license the Java platform in smartphones,
based upon the unsuccessful discussions of such licensing with Google.224
212. Id. at 1188.
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Thus, upon balancing the factors, the court found that Google’s use of
Oracle’s API packages was not fair and remanded to the district court to
determine damages.225
V. TRADE SECRET UPDATE
IP practitioners should be aware of some interesting developments in
Texas regarding the interpretation and applicability of the Texas anti-
SLAPP statute, the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). While the
TCPA had its origin in the media context, Texas courts have interpreted
the scope of the statute and applied it in other areas of law.226 IP is one
area of applicability where the TCPA can be a powerful weapon.
A. APPLICABILITY OF THE TCPA TO STATE-BASED IP CASES
While federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over many IP-based
causes of action, including claims for patent or copyright infringement,227
trade secret misappropriation cases are often brought under state law,
and Texas is no exception. Thus, the TCPA may be applicable in appro-
priate trade secret cases based on Texas state law.228 The TCPA may also
apply in trademark cases brought under state trademark law. Other cases
that involve IP issues may also be susceptible to TCPA motions to dismiss
if the underlying cause of action sounds in state law, like technology-
based contract, tort, civil conspiracy, or unfair competition actions. In
short, the TCPA is a statute to be aware of in a myriad of IP issues.
Under the TCPA, a court must dismiss a legal action that “is based on,
relates to, or is in response to” the party’s exercise of the right of free
speech, the right to petition, or the right of association.229 One example
of the TCPA’s broad applicability is the case of Elite Auto Body LLC v.
Autocraft Bodywerks, Inc.230 In Elite, a group of individuals left their cur-
rent employment and formed a new company to compete with their for-
mer employer.231 The former employees allegedly took their former
employer’s trade secrets and communicated them in pursuit of their new
business venture, including about the allegedly misappropriated trade
secrets.232 The former employer sued for trade secret misappropriation,
and the former employees responded with a TCPA motion that the law-
suit is based on, related to, or in response to their exercise of their rights
of association and, therefore, susceptible to dismissal under the TCPA.233
The Austin Court of Appeals dismissed the trade secret claims and re-
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manded for a determination of the appropriate measure of attorney’s fees
and sanctions.234
One unresolved issue is whether the TCPA applies in a trial of state law
causes of action in federal court. Some federal courts have also held that
the TCPA applies when the court is sitting in diversity jurisdiction.235
However the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has not yet re-
solved this issue.236
VI. CONCLUSION
The developments in IP law during the Survey period brought certainty
to some questions but left plenty of questions to be answered. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court laid to rest a constitutional challenge to the legis-
latively-created IPR scheme but limited the PTO’s discretion regarding
how to conduct the IPRs, and made clear that other constitutional chal-
lenges may have different outcomes. The Federal Circuit’s holding in
Berkheimer v. HP Inc. has prompted some additional guidance for patent
eligibility determinations at the PTO, and its decision in Saint Regis Mo-
hawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals shut down a potentially disruptive
patent-shielding scheme. The federal courts also clarified standards for
assessing secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion in trademark
law and weighed in on the revocability of trademark licenses in the con-
text of Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In summary, the Survey period reflects
changes in the law that provide incremental gains in certainty for private
parties and practitioners alike.
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